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This study reassesses the ability of the mass media to inﬂuence voter opinions directly. Combining
data on media content with individuals’ assessments of British political parties during the 2005 general
election campaign allows a test of newspapers’ persuasive inﬂuence in a way previously considered a
‘virtual impossibility’. Utilizing repeated measures from the 2005 BES campaign panel, multilevel
regression analysis reveals signiﬁcant impact of partisan slant not just on the evaluation of the party
mentioned but also on evaluations of its competitor(s). The strongest evidence of direct media
persuasion is provided by the ﬁnding that variation in slant over the campaign drives how undecided
voters evaluate the incumbent government party, even when controlling for a newspaper’s average
partisan slant.
The idea of the media as active persuader of the public has waxed and waned in media
research over the past decades. The pervasiveness of the media is now accepted, but its
persuasiveness is often dismissed. This article aims to challenge this notion, in line with
recent work in political science and political communication investigating the conditions
under which partisan bias and editorial comment can have a direct and directional impact
on public opinion.1
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We build on the argument that media effects in general and persuasive effects in particular
are ‘more fugitive than minimal’2 – showing that their fugitiveness is caused by an absence of
suitable data, rather than the absence of substantial impact. We employ panel data on
individual voters during the British general election campaignin 2005 and combine this with
content analysis data of newspapers for the same period. This allows us to link individual
voters to the printed media they were exposed to during the campaign and compare change
in individual party preferences with media input during the campaign. The research design is
a substantial step towards what Iyengar and Simon dubbed ‘a virtual impossibility’ little
over a decade ago.3 By differentiating between overall partisan stances of newspapers and
variation in their bias over the course of the campaign, we can distinguish the reinforcing
and mobilizing functions of partisan media from their role in shaping and shifting attitudes.
On that basis, we draw tentative conclusions about the extent to which media persuasion
contributes to how undecided voters make an electoral choice.
MEDIA PERSUASION: EXISTING RESEARCH
The idea of media as persuaders is an old one, championed byWalter Lippmann who saw the
press as an organizer (albeit ill-equipped) of public opinion, and by Harold Lasswell and
Edward Bernays, who theorized about the effectiveness and pervasiveness of political and
commercial propaganda.4 Such propositions about the role of propaganda, advertising and
persuasive media impact were based on the assumption that audiences are passive and
susceptible masses and hence that media and campaigns will impact directly on public
attitudes and behaviour.5 The Columbia studies of presidential campaigns in the 1940s were
seminal works in this ﬁeld, providing the ﬁrst systematic attempt to test such propositions
empirically and, in the process, set the stage for decades to follow by establishing the
minimal effects model. They found media messages not to be primary causes of opinion
formation or change but instead to be bounded by and disseminated through social context.6
These ﬁndings of limited media impact served to discourage further research7, and their effect
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4 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1922); Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Theory
of Political Propaganda’, American Political Science Review, 21 (1927), 627–31; Edward G. Bernays,
Propaganda (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928).
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is still felt today, especially in electoral research in which the role of campaigns and mass
media is still discounted by many.8
But there are good grounds to question the limited effects model and to argue that
effects are not insubstantial but rather fugitive, i.e. difﬁcult to detect. Bartels was the ﬁrst
to challenge the minimal effects model head-on. He argued that measurement error and
limitations in research design, such as the short time-frames used in previous studies,
made it virtually impossible to appreciate the potential scale of media impact on electoral
choice.9 In addition, Zaller has shown that detection of campaign and media effects
depends not solely on their occurrence but crucially on survey size and model
speciﬁcations.10 Further obstacles to a valid and reliable assessment of media effects may
lie in the operationalization of media variables, the level of aggregation and the use of cross-
sectional rather than panel data.
Bartels and Zaller provide important starting points in this regard because, while
challenging the minimal effects conclusions, they both remain within the paradigm of
media exposure effects research that was pioneered by the Columbia studies. The idea
behind this approach is that, if media is able to inﬂuence public opinion, then those who
are consuming more news and political coverage should be more affected. Lazarsfeld and
Berelson looked primarily for a switch in support for candidates over six waves of their
panel study, expecting that those more exposed to media coverage would be observed to
have switched more often between candidates, but concluded that for the most part
campaigns merely ‘preserve prior decisions instead of initiating new [ones]’.11 In essence,
this approach does not study media persuasion because it only estimates the impact of
being more or less exposed to the media and not the differential impact of the kind of
media and messages to which one is exposed.
A resulting problem, typically encountered in but not exclusive to media exposure
studies, is that media impact appears to remain limited because diverging messages tend
to cancel each other out.12 This is a problem of aggregation – unless one were to assume
that people are exposed to all diverging views presented by the media, or that people read
the whole spectrum of views carried by the media in the speciﬁc outlet they favour. Both
options are unlikely, meaning that media messages may well balance out at aggregate
level but are unlikely to do so at individual level. Individual voters will be exposed to the
particular views carried by their favoured outlets only, and divergent media messages cannot
be an explanation for an absence of media effects. But data at the individual level are needed
to show this. In the absence of such data, one has to exploit, as Erikson did, rare occasions
like the ‘break from homogeneous mass media treatments’ in the 1964 US election to show
media effects resulting from diverging media messages that unevenly distribute across local
communities.13 In similar vein, the shift from a Tory press to a ‘Tony press’ in Britain during
the mid-1990s inspired renewed research interest in media persuasion effects.14 Ladd and
8 Norris, ‘Did the Media Matter?’
9 Bartels, ‘Messages Received’.
10 John Zaller, ‘The Statistical Power of Election Studies to Detect Media Exposure Effects’.
11 Lazarsfeld et al., The People’s Choice, p. 87.
12 John Zaller, The Origins and Nature of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992); Bartels, ‘Messages Received’, p. 276.
13 Erikson, ‘The Inﬂuence of Newspaper Endorsements in Presidential Elections’, p. 207.
14 Colin Seymour-Ure, ‘Editorial Opinion in the National Press’, Parliamentary Affairs, 50 (1997),
586–608; Dominic Wring, ‘The Tony press: media coverage of the election campaign’, in A. Geddes and
John Tongue, eds, Labour’s Second Landslide (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
Pressed into Party Support? 443
Lenz convincingly demonstrate that some readers followed their paper’s shift in allegiance
from the Conservatives in 1992 to Labour in 1997.15
Using endorsements to operationalize media input, as Ladd and Lenz did, presents an
important step forward since they address the fact that some media, most notably
newspapers, attempt to sway their audiences. A number of studies have found that newspaper
endorsements, and changes thereof, have an impact on attitudes.16 Endorsements, and hence
partisan tendencies, are also reﬂected in how a campaign is covered and the comments that
are made on it in a newspaper.17 But studies of media impact that use endorsements as their
independent variable tend to treat them as unambiguous and to model the newspaper as
being in support of party A or candidate X, against party B or candidate Y. And, despite the
fact that descriptive studies of newspaper endorsements increasingly emphasize variation and
ambiguity by substituting simple dichotomous variables with typologies that allow for
variation in strength and direction of endorsement,18 only a few of the scholars who study the
impact of endorsements have adopted this approach.19 There is a further drawback to
employing endorsements as proxies for actual persuasive media input: it ignores variation in
slant over the course of a campaign. It is reasonable to assume that newspapers will vary not
only with regard to the intensity of their persuasive intent but also with regard to the intensity
and consistency of their persuasive effort. Persuasion is a process that requires variation and
repetition of arguments in order to alter someone’s state of mind, which is the precondition
for persuasion to ultimately succeed.20
A more nuanced assessment of a newspaper’s persuasive intent and effort captures the
trajectory of the paper’s endorsement over the course of the campaign, i.e. ‘the quantity
and tone of a media outlet’s candidate coverage as inﬂuenced by its editorial position’.21
Content analysis of the media can provide us with objective measures of the judgements
15 Ladd and Lenz, ‘Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift’, p. 405.
16 Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1968[1937]); Erikson, ‘The Inﬂuence of Newspaper Endorsements in Presidential Elections’;
Coombs, ‘Editorial Endorsements and Electoral Outcomes’; Wagner, ‘Media Do Make a Difference’;
Richard Webber, ‘The 1992 General Election: Constituency Results and Local Patterns of National
Newspaper Readership’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 3 (1993), 205–15; John Curtice
and Holli A. Semetko, ‘Does It Matter What the Paper Say?’ in Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John
Curtice, eds, Labour Last Chance? (Aldershot, Surrey: Dartmouth, 1994); John Curtice, ‘Is the Sun
Shining on Tony Blair? The Electoral Inﬂuence of British Newspapers’, Harvard International Journal of
Press/Politics, 2 (1997), 9–26; Kenneth Newton and Malcolm Brynin, ‘The National Press and Party
Voting in the UK’, Political Studies, 49 (2001), 265–85; Norris, ‘Did the Media Matter?’; Ladd and Lenz,
‘Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift’.
17 Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney, ‘The Slant of the News: How Editorial Endorsements
Inﬂuence Campaign Coverage and Citizens’ Views of Candidates’, American Political Science Review, 96
(2002), 381–94.
18 David Deacon and Dominic Wring, ‘Partisan Dealignment and the British Press’, in John Bartle,
Simon Atkinson and Roger Mortimore, eds, Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of
2001 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 197–214.
19 The use of an overly simplistic dichotomy that divides the press into Conservative v. Labour papers
may explain why an earlier study of the 2005 British general election found only limited persuasion effects
on party and leader evaluations or vote choice, with some of the signiﬁcant estimates even pointing in the
wrong direction; see Norris, ‘Did the Media Matter?’, pp. 210–13.
20 David W. Schumann, Richard E. Petty and D. Scott Clemons, ‘Predicting the Effectiveness of
Different Strategies of Advertising Variation: A Test of the Repetition-Variation Hypothesis’, Journal of
Consumer Research, 17 (1990), 192–202.
21 Druckman and Parkin, ‘The Impact of Media Bias’, p. 1030.
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and opinions addressed to a paper’s readers, describing the extent of partisan slant and its
variation over time. An increasing number of researchers opt for such content analysis
measures as input variables. When combined with cross-sectional survey data, which
allow control for partisan predispositions, almost invariably these measures suggest a
direct impact of media messages on partisan attitudes or vote choice.22 Such studies
examine ‘differences in coverage, and ultimately, if these differences affect voters’.23 While
these studies successfully address the varied nature of persuasive efforts, their ﬁndings remain
tenuous because the use of cross-sectional survey data does not allow adequate modelling of
the receiving end of persuasion – the readers and the process of being persuaded.
Persuasion – a dynamic process – cannot be established through the use of stationary
data. Some researchers address this by simulating how public opinion moves from an
initially observed original state in response to directional media stimuli, others by
studying variation in media effects measured over the course of a campaign through the
use of rolling cross-sectional surveys.24 Both approaches result in ﬁndings of substantial
media impact. However, since media persuasion is an individual-level process, we cannot
properly assess the extent of its impact from aggregate-level shifts in partisan support.
Individual-level panel data are therefore required. Kleinnijenhuis et al. use an impressive
thirteen waves of the Dutch Telepanel study during the 1998 campaign and a smaller
panel study from the German election campaign in 1998 to show that, in both countries,
media presentation of issue developments helps issue-owning parties and that all parties
are affected by positive or negative coverage of their party leaders.25 De Vreese and
Boomgaarden take another signiﬁcant step forward by moving from aggregate-level to
individual-level analysis of media-induced opinion change. Strongly biased pro-European
Union coverage in most Danish media led to corresponding opinion change, while more
balanced coverage in the Netherlands and one Danish newspaper left readers unaffected.26
However, since both studies miss the critical data linking respondents with actual media
consumed, media-persuasion cannot be unequivocally assessed in their designs.
The study we present here combines repeated measures of voters’ opinions with information
about the content of their preferred newspaper over the course of the campaign. We are,
therefore, able to assess the inﬂuence British newspapers have on their readers – an inﬂuence
that indeed proves to be substantial.
22 Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro and Glenn R. Dempsey, ‘What Moves Public Opinion?’ American
Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 23–43; David P. Fan and Albert R. Tims, ‘The Impact of the News Media
on Public Opinion: American Presidential Election 1987–1988’, International Journal of Public Opinion
Research, 1 (1989), 151–63; Dalton et al., ‘Partisan Cues and the Media’; Neil T. Gavin and David Sanders,
‘The Press and Its Inﬂuence on British Political Attitudes under New Labour’, Political Studies, 51 (2003),
573–91; Agnieszka Dobrzynska, Andre´ Blais and Richard Nadeau, ‘Do the Media have a Direct Impact on
the Vote? The Case of the 1997 Canadian Election’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 15
(2003), 27–43; Peter, ‘Our Long Return to the Concept of Powerful Mass Media’; Druckman and Parkin, ‘The
Impact of Media Bias’; De Vreese and Boomgarden, ‘Media Message Flow’.
23 Druckman and Parkin, ‘The Impact of Media Bias’, p. 1031.
24 Fan and Tims, ‘The Impact of the News Media on Public Opinion’; Jan Kleinnijenhuis and David
P. Fan, ‘Media Coverage and the Flow of Voters in Multiparty Systems: The 1994 National Elections in
Holland and Germany’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 11 (1999), 233–56; Dobrzynska
et al., ‘Do the Media have a Direct Impact on the Vote?’
25 Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Marcus Maurer, Hans Mathias Kepplinger and Dirk Oegema, ‘Issues and
Personalities in German and Dutch Television News: Patterns and Effects’, European Journal of
Communication, 16 (2001), 337–59.
26 De Vreese and Boomgarden, ‘Media Message Flow’.
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Before presenting our data and model, we need to address our dependent variable. The
ultimate test of media persuasion in any given election is the extent that it can be shown to
impact on actual vote choice,27 since ‘the notion of success is embedded in the concept
of persuasion’.28 But in doing so we risk searching only for the tip of the iceberg,
ignoring substantial effects hidden under the surface. Over the course of the campaign,
the media may affect people’s attitudes towards parties, although not always to the point
where voters will actually change their party preference. Nevertheless, readers may go
from ‘deﬁnitely not voting for that party’ to ‘might consider it’ – a shift in party
appreciation, although not yet consequential at the polling booth. At the next election,
however, such a voter might be swayed from ‘might consider’ to ‘will likely vote for this
party’. An emphasis on vote choice may mean these more gradual effects of media
inﬂuence remain undetected. To avoid this, we make use of party thermometer scores, a
measure that allows for much ﬁner distinctions in party support than the ipsative party
choice measure. The precision of this measure is well suited to the precision of our
research design. A reﬁned measure of partisan sympathies allows us to trace the impact of
the often subtle shifts in campaign coverage recorded in our content analysis.
The theoretical literature about the concept of persuasion supports this choice of
dependent variable. Burnell and Reeve state that ‘the strengthening or weakening of y
attachment to an existing position’ is included in the deﬁnition of persuasion.29 In similar
vein, O’Keefe states that ‘even when a persuader’s eventual aim is to inﬂuence what
people do y, at least in paradigm cases of persuasion that aim is ordinarily seen to be
accomplished by changing what people think’.30 Persuasion is a process of ‘inﬂuencing
others by inﬂuencing their mental states’.31
But, as will become clear from our research design and ﬁndings, a focus on how media
inﬂuences mental states, through the strengthening or weakening of attitudes, does not mean
that media effects are restricted to mere reinforcement or ‘preservation of prior attitudes’, as
concluded in the Columbia studies. Gradual media-induced attitude change can be shown to
contribute substantially to the making of electoral choices during a campaign.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
In this section, we will ﬁrst discuss our main independent and dependent variables of
interest: newspaper tone and party evaluation. We will then discuss additional variables
included in our model, and the analytical structure.
We quantiﬁed the newspaper reporting of the 2005 campaign by means of a content
analysis. We coded any mentioning of parties and party leaders, and also the tone
(positive or negative) of these articles. The data describe the tone of reporting on party
and party leaders in editorials and articles on the opinion pages (‘op-ed’) of seven national
27 Dobrzynska et al., ‘Do the Media have a Direct Impact on the Vote?’, p. 31; see also Lazarsfeld et al.,
The People’s Choice; Kleinnijenhuis et al., ‘Issues and Personalities in German and Dutch Television News’.
28 Daniel J. O’Keefe, Persuasion: Theory and Research, 2nd edn (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 2002),
p. 3. See also Douglas Walton, ‘What is Propaganda, and What Exactly Is Wrong with It?’ Public Affairs
Quarterly, 11(1997), 383–413, p. 394; and Bryan Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and
Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 2ff.
29 Peter Burnell and Andrew Reeve, ‘Persuasion as a Political Concept’, British Journal of Political
Science, 14 (1984), 393–410, pp. 394–6.
30 O’Keefe, ‘Persuasion’, p. 4.
31 O’Keefe, ‘Persuasion’, p. 5.
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daily newspapers (Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Independent, Sun
and The Times).32 All weekday (Monday-Saturday) issues published after the dissolution
of parliament on 5 April up until election day on 5 May were included, and all articles on
op-ed pages were coded for party and party leader references as well as the tone of any
such reference.33 A deliberately conservative approach was taken when coding tone, with
statements only coded as positive or negative if they contained a clear value judgement by
the author(s) of the article. Hence, a statement to the effect that ‘the polls and focus
groups showed y that Blair was unpopular and untrusted’ would not be coded as a
negative remark since it merely reports opinions that others have expressed.34 Only if an
author openly criticized the behaviour or actions of a politician or party was this coded as
negative; only if a politician or party was openly praised by the paper was the statement
coded as positive. While we acknowledge that reporting of negative news or negative
public opinion may hurt a party, in a media persuasion study we are explicitly interested in the
power of newspapers to inﬂuence their readers directly through their political judgements.
Hence, we restrict our coding to incidents of open and intentional bias. In the original content
analysis, only op-ed pieces were coded for tone, to avoid more interpretive evaluations of
content or frames that help or hurt one party.35 But, since prior research suggests a strong
correlation between editorial tone and tendencies in news reporting, our selection of op-ed
coding can be treated as sampling and the material used as a meaningful proxy for the
overall partisan tendencies in newspapers.36 Assuming that actual bias will be weaker in
news reporting than on opinion pages, a study exclusively focusing on op-ed pages is
unproblematic, because it is rather prone to underestimating the true scale of effects.
For every article, single standardized lines of text formed the basic unit of measurement.37
Positive statements were given a score of 11, neutral statements a zero and negative
statements a 21. Thus, we are able to calculate the average tone of any single article, and
from that the average tone of a paper for any given day or week of the campaign. This is
particularly relevant because it means we can go beyond campaign averages and match our
respondents’ attitudes during the campaign with the speciﬁc input they received up to that
day.38 Our newspaper averages range between 21 and 11 and are comparable between
newspapers and over time.
32 We selected seven of the largest and most prominent newspapers to provide a sample of the British
media landscape that accounts for variation in newspaper type (broadsheets, red-tops and black-tops) and
partisan tendencies (Labour and Tory papers as well as newspapers with more ambiguous endorsements
like the Independent).
33 For an extensive description of the data, see Heinz Brandenburg, ‘Party Strategy and Media Bias: A
Quantitative Analysis of the 2005 UK Election Campaign’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties,
16 (2006), 157–78.
34 Larry Elliott, ‘Why Alastair Campbell made Blair eat humble pie: Polls proved that only Gordon
Brown could deliver a third Labour term’, Guardian, 21 April 2005, p. 26.
35 Brandenburg, ‘Party Strategy and Media Bias’.
36 See Kahn and Kenney, ‘The Slant of the News’.
37 We standardized text lines because columns width tends to vary within and between newspapers. Our
standardization procedure consisted of multiplying the number of text lines of any data entry with its
observed column width and then dividing by the average column width across the entire dataset.
38 This design also allows us to assess the impact of the sheer volume of positive or negative
evaluations, or the trade off between positive and negative reporting (in other words, whether, e.g., 20
positive versus 20 negative statements have a comparable effect to that of two or three positive and
negative points). These measures were included in initial analysis but require further exploration and are
not included in the analyses presented here.
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To measure the effect of this input, we make use of survey data collected before, during
and after the 2005 general elections through the 2005 British Election Study (BES) campaign
panel, an internet panel carried out by Yougov. The BES campaign panel consisted of three
waves with respondents interviewed online, once before the ofﬁcial campaign started, then
again at some stage during the campaign, and ﬁnally shortly after election day.39 Retention
throughout the three stages was 76 per cent, resulting in a total of 4,894 respondents who
completed all three interviews. We only include data from respondents who completed all
three interviews and read one of our coded newspapers. Almost 75 per cent of our panel
sample read a newspaper regularly. Of these, almost 80 per cent were readers of the seven
coded newspapers.
The BES campaign data include information on a large number of personal characteristics
including newspaper readership, and party evaluation via thermometer scores. For,
each of the three main parties (Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats), these
thermometer questions ask respondents to give a score ranging from 0 (strongly dislike) to
10 (strongly like) to each party in all three waves of the panel.40
What the Papers Say
Table 1 gives an overview of the collected content data that we use for analysis here.41
Overall, a total of nearly 1,000 opinion pieces containing over 155,000 individual lines of
text were coded. Around two-thirds of the text in these opinion pieces had references to
political parties. As we can see, very little of the newspaper opinions about parties turned
out to be positive.
As would be expected given the British media and political landscape at the time, the
incumbent Labour government featured heavily in newspaper commentary and opinion
pieces, with up to 60 per cent of all commentary directed at Labour. The Conservatives
featured in 26 per cent of all text, the Liberal Democrats in 10 per cent, while other parties
39 The use of internet panels remains subject to criticism because of limitations in the sampling and
selection procedures of some of these panels, which it is said might result in violations of analytical
assumptions or possible bias in the ﬁndings. However, in an extensive survey comparison, the team of
researchers that conducted the 2001 and 2005 British Election Study addressed most of the contentious
issues. They argued that, while on the one hand sampling problems remain with internet surveys because
internet access is not randomly distributed, internet surveys on the other hand address some core
problems with face-to-face surveys, for example by eliminating interviewer effects. They also found that
while marginal distributions of key variables differ across both types of survey, when estimating
parameters in vote choice and turnout models, face-to-face and internet surveys yield remarkably similar
results. Also, issues of over- or under-representation of social groups appear to be dealt with effectively
through weighting procedures in internet surveys carried out by Yougov. See David Sanders, Harold D.
Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley, ‘Does Mode Matter for Modeling Political Choice?
Evidence from the 2005 British Election Study’, Political Analysis, 15 (2007), 257–85. Most importantly,
however, our aim is to assess possible attitude change through media effects, which does not require our
sample of newspaper readers to be nationally representative. For this reason, the graphs presented below,
as well as subsequent regression models, are based on data that are not weighted to reﬂect nationally
representative readership ﬁgures.
40 Because of an error in the programming of the questionnaire for Wave 1, respondents were not
actually able to give parties a score of 10, but instead could only give a maximum score of 9. In our
analysis, this is addressed by applying a scale factor to the Wave 1 scores.
41 Data included in our analysis comprise content analysis of op-ed pages only, since only these articles
were coded for slant. The entire 2005 newspaper dataset is much larger and also contains content analysis
of all news stories about the campaign (see Brandenburg, ‘Party Strategy and Media Bias’ for a
description of the entire dataset).
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were largely ignored. With regard to the tone of reporting in the newspapers, the amount
of positive and negative judgements is roughly similar for all three major parties. The
majority of comments about them are neutral, with around 40 per cent negative and only
4–6 per cent positive. References to other (minor) parties are overwhelmingly neutral.
Party treatment did vary markedly between newspapers. Figure 1, presenting average
tone for the twenty-six days of the 2005 campaign, offers us various insights.42 The
predominantly negative treatment of parties is a feature characteristic of most papers. But
press partisanship lives on in Britain, underlined by the variation in support for parties
between newspapers. Figure 1 also demonstrates that reliance on party endorsements as
proxy for media content oversimpliﬁes matters, as the intensity of this support, represented by
the mean scores, varies substantially between newspapers.
TABLE 1 Overall Tone of Comments on Parties in the Seven Daily Newspapers
Coded during the 2005 General Election Campaign
Party
No. of standardized
text lines
Per cent
positive
Per cent
neutral
Per cent
negative
Labour 59,005 6 52 42
Conservatives 25,725 6 59 36
Liberal Democrats 10,954 4 56 40
Other parties 2,720 8 77 15
Total 98,404 6 55 39
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Fig. 1. Newspaper tone (partisan slant) during the 2005 campaign – mean scores and variation over the
course of the campaign
42 Daily average tone scores were calculated from the coded text for each party in each newspaper
(n5 26). Accordingly, the boxplots indicate the mean and quartile range calculated from twenty-six
individual scores per party.
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Also of relevance is the substantial spread around the mean, indicating variation in a
paper’s party approval over the course of the campaign. Newspapers vary the intensity of
their praise and criticism, and hence readers are subjected to differences in party
treatment over the course of the election campaign.
Because newspaper tone varies over the campaign, we are able to circumvent an issue
that might otherwise be encountered, namely the question of whether readers are
inﬂuenced by their paper’s partisan tendencies or choose their paper because of its known
partisan stance. Readers can select a newspaper on the basis of what we will refer to as the
‘house effect’ of a newspaper: its average tone of reporting on a party. But readers cannot
control the variation in this tone over the campaign period, which Figure 1 shows to be
substantial. Thus, even if readers have selected a paper whose tone matches their own
views, they are still exposed to various levels of intensity of a newspaper’s tone of
reporting on a party. Any effect of such variation in tone on partisan attitudes provides
unambiguous evidence of media impact, because of its independence from overall
partisan slant.
What the Papers Say and What the Readers Think
In the following analyses we assess whether and how much the media inﬂuence voters: to
what degree did the tone of newspaper editorials and opinion articles affect how a
respondent rated the three main parties over the course of the 2005 election campaign?
Our main independent variable of interest is the tone of newspaper reporting. Our
dependent variable is party evaluation. Feeling thermometer scores not only offer a more
reﬁned measure of partisan attitudes compared with vote choice, but they also suffer less
from missing data since, especially in the early stages of the campaign, many respondents
have not (yet) made a choice for one party. We analyse thermometer scores for each of the
three main parties in three separate models, including only respondents who answered
that party’s feeling thermometer question in all three waves. Before explaining the
operationalization of our newspaper variable and discussing the analytical model and
ﬁndings, we will brieﬂy introduce the control variables that we include in our models.
Control Variables
One of our main concerns is to avoid an endogeneity problem often inherent in the study
of directional, persuasive media effects, namely to make sure that we do not ascribe an
ambiguous causal impact to newspapers when a respondent may actually have chosen
that paper speciﬁcally because of the opinions it voices. There are two ways to address this
issue, via a ﬁxed effects regression model, or, more traditionally, via inclusion of control
variables. We will employ both methods and show that they lead to similar results.
We control for a number of key predictors of prior attitudes towards political parties.
We include gender, age, income, education, class and party identiﬁcation. Together, these
constitute a well-speciﬁed model of party evaluations. For each respondent, the socio-
economic and demographic characteristics will not vary over the course of the campaign
and are therefore held constant at the level established in the ﬁrst wave. Individual party
identiﬁcation may in principle vary over the course of the campaign, as indeed it does,
with levels of party identiﬁcation increasing slightly between Waves 1 and 2. However,
here the panel data pose a problem because of a split-sample design in which a different
question wording is used to assess party identiﬁcation in Wave 1 and 2 for part of the
sample, thus introducing a substantial design effect. Although we acknowledge that party
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identiﬁcation may vary over the course of the campaign, we are therefore forced to
classify our respondents on the basis of their party identiﬁcation as measured in Wave 2
only, removing possible variation at the individual level for this control variable.
As further controls we include indicator variables for interviews held in Wave 2 and
Wave 3. Initial analyses showed a substantial change in party evaluation especially from
Wave 1 to Wave 2. In part this could be an artefact of the coding error mentioned earlier.
However, a higher appraisal of political parties is not uncommon during the ‘feast of
democracy’ – in other words, during elections.43
While the focus of this article is the impact of newspaper slant on party evaluations,
respondents are of course exposed to a more varied media landscape, as well as to
campaign events and interpersonal conversations. With regard to the media, the most
obvious additional source is television, while the internet continues to gain importance.
We have no means of assessing the impact of the internet. We do have some means to
assess the effect of television news coverage, albeit not in the way we would have liked,
i.e., comparable to newspaper impact. The reason for this is that, although we have
content-coded both ITV and BBC news broadcasts, the BES does not include an indicator
on television viewing in the way it does for newspaper readership. As a result of this, we
are only able to include television news as a control variable to assess the impact of
newspaper tone accurately. Inclusion of both ITV and BBC news indicators leads to
multicollinearity issues. Since the latter drew a larger audience, we include seven-day
moving average scores of the BBC news tone on each party.44 The BES data do not allow
us to control for campaign events or interpersonal conversations and we acknowledge
that such other inﬂuences may well have a persuasive impact. Importantly, however, it is
unlikely that these unobserved inﬂuences are confounding our media effects. While it
would be crucial to control for external factors in, for example, an agenda-setting study in
order to establish that media agendas are truly independent variables rather than
responses to party agendas or reﬂections of campaign dynamics, this is less important
with regard to media tone. Newspaper opinions and judgements are not simple reﬂections
but biased interpretations of campaign events and dynamics, and as such they are highly
unlikely to correlate fully with opinions expressed within a reader’s personal network or
conveyed through other channels. Thus, we are conﬁdent that the lack of detailed
information on personal networks or additional news channels does not lead us to
overestimate the effects of media tone.
Newspaper Tone
Different newspapers will vary in their tone towards parties. But newspapers will also
vary in their tone towards a party over the course of a campaign. To acknowledge this, we
43 Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk, ‘De campagne deed er toe, mediagebruik niet’, in Philip
van Praag Jr and Kees Brants, eds, Tussen Beeld en Inhoud. Politiek en media in de verkiezingen van 1998
(Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2000), pp. 214–42; Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk, ‘Welke
effecten hadden de campagnes nu eigenlijk?’ in Kees Brants and Philip van Praag, eds, Politiek en Media
in Verwarring. De verkiezingscampagnes in het lange jaar 2002 (Amsterdam: Spinhuis, 2005), pp. 244–67.
44 In our content analysis of media channels, we also included evening news broadcasts on ITV and
BBC. Since news broadcasts prove inherently more neutral than newspaper op-ed articles, the coding of
television news differs from newspaper coding. In newspaper coding, any opinion voiced by anyone other
than the author was not coded. However, television newscasts largely broadcast only such statements
from party ofﬁcials, experts or interviewed citizens, and therefore these statements were coded for
partisan bias.
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include our media variables in pairs of two indicators. The ﬁrst indicates the average tone
of the newspaper at the start of the campaign. We may think of this as the ‘house effect’ of
the paper: its general stance towards a party. This media indicator will explain party
evaluation between readers of different papers.
The second media indicator is centred on the average newspaper tone. Hence, it
indicates whether that paper was, before the timing of a respondent’s interview, writing
more positively or negatively about a party than it usually does. This second media
indicator will explain variation within readers over the course of the campaign.
The beneﬁt of this approach is that we are not only able to differentiate between readers
of the different papers, on the basis of the ‘house effects’ (the ﬁrst media indicator), but
also able to establish the effect of variation in tone over the course of the campaign,
within each newspaper. While the former is susceptible to endogeneity bias (which is why
we include party identiﬁcation as a control variable), the second variable is not affected by
this because it controls for average tone (i.e., differences between newspapers). Thus, this
second media variable is our most rigid test of possible media effects.45
The average tone of a newspaper can be calculated on a day to day basis. Since we
know when each respondent was interviewed, we could calculate the average tone for that
particular day and use this as media indicator for that respondent. However, that would
suggest that respondents are only affected by what their paper writes on that particular
day, ignoring all that went before, which seems unlikely. Hence, we base our media tone
indicators on the average of the newspaper tone for the preceding seven days of the
campaign.46 For the post-election interview, we use the average of the last seven days of
the campaign. For the pre-campaign period, we face a slight problem as we do not have
content analysis data for the pre-campaign period. Therefore, we use the average of the
ﬁrst three days of the campaign as proxy-indicator for the pre-campaign interview.
While we expect a respondent’s opinion of a party to be affected by a paper’s tone on that
party, parties are in competition with each other, and hence voter’s opinions may be affected
by the media’s tone on other parties as well. Ideally, we would therefore include information
on all three major parties. While we have coded information on the paper’s tone for the three
major parties, a model including information on all three parties proves problematic, because
of multicollinearity issues.47 Therefore, we include indicators for the paper’s tone on the party
and its main contender.48 Each model therefore includes two pairs of newspaper tone
indicators: average newspaper tone, and variation around that average, for both parties.
Who Is the Most Affected?
There are two groups of readers who are of special interest to us: those who read their
newspaper on a daily basis, and the undecided voters.
45 Note that in a ﬁxed effects model the ﬁrst media indicator is automatically created, and is redundant.
The second media indicator is hence most reﬂective of the media indicator variable in a ﬁxed effects
model. In multilevel literature, the procedure is often referred to as group-mean centering. Cf. Paul D.
Allison, Effects Regression Methods for Longitudinal Data Using SAS (Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute, 2005).
46 For respondents interviewed during the ﬁrst six days of the campaign, the average was based on the
number of days in the campaign so far.
47 These multicollinearity issues stem largely from the fact that a newspaper treatment of a party over
the course of the campaign tends to be related to its treatment of the other parties.
48 For Labour and the Conservatives, tone on these two parties has been included. For the Liberal
Democrats, separate models including tone on Labour or the Conservatives were run. Note that exclusion
of tone on a third party does not reduce the explanatory power of the model.
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Potentially, daily readers may be most affected by a newspaper’s tone, since ‘getting the
news is a prerequisite to being affected by the news’, and they are exposed to it every
day.49 Alternatively, though, they may be less affected, having grown familiar with and
perhaps desensitized to the newspaper’s tone over a longer period. They also tend to be
more politically sophisticated, more partisan and hence more convinced of their views and
not easily persuaded.50 Therefore, we treat this as an empirical question and test for the
effect of reading the paper daily by including a dummy indicator, and interact it with
newspaper tone.51
The second group of readers in whom we are particularly interested comprised the
undecided voters. These are respondents who did not have an expressed party choice at
the start of the campaign or who changed their preference over the course of it. We
include in this group everyone who was undecided in Waves 1 and 2, who ultimately did
not vote, or changed their vote choice between waves. About half of our respondents ﬁt
this category. Previous research leads us to expect the media to inﬂuence those involved in
an active decision-making process more strongly than those who had already expressed a
choice in Wave 1 and stuck with that choice through to polling day.52 Just as for daily
readers, we include a dummy variable for undecided voters, and interact this with our
newspaper tone variables. We expect the variation in tone over the course of the campaign
to affect undecided voters more strongly. We do not necessarily expect a greater inﬂuence
of ‘house effects’ (the average tone of a newspaper towards a party) for undecided voters,
but it is worth testing for this nevertheless.
Analytical Model
Our analytical model is a multilevel regression model, taking into account the nested
structure of the data. It models the repeated measurements – before, during and after the
campaign – as nested within respondents to correct for the dependence of observations
within respondents (intra-class correlations). We present ﬁndings from two types of
multilevel models: ﬁrst, a random effects multilevel regression including control variables;
second, a ﬁxed effects regression, where the model controls for variation between and
respondents using instrumental dummy variables.
In the random effects multilevel regression we include a number of characteristics as
control variables at the individual level (described above). Over the three waves of our
panel, these characteristics do not vary within respondents, and they serve, therefore, to
explain initial differences in feeling thermometer scores between respondents. In addition
to these time-invariant characteristics, we also include characteristics that do vary over
time: our media content indicators. These characteristics at the second level do vary over
49 Vincent Price and John Zaller ‘Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and
Their Implications for Research’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 57(1993), 133–63, p. 158.
50 Zaller, ‘Origins and Nature of Mass Opinion’.
51 At face value, it might seem desirable also to include non-readers as a control group whose opinion
change over the campaign could serve as a baseline against which to assess media effects. Not only would
this complicate the model speciﬁcation but also, and more fundamentally, we are not proposing that
readers as a whole are pushed in a direction different from that of non-readers. Rather, our models
explain patterns of opinion change that result from speciﬁc media inputs – whether readers are actually
persuaded by what their papers say. For that purpose, what matters are the differences in the messages
readers are exposed to, and not any differences between the exposed and the unexposed.
52 Patrick Fournier, Richard Nadeau, Andre´ Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte, ‘Time-of-
Voting Decision and Susceptibility to Campaign Effects’, Electoral Studies, 23 (2004), 661–81.
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time, and hence they may explain variation in party thermometer scores over the course of
the campaign. The model estimates a regression line for the whole of the sample while –
depending on the model speciﬁcation – both the intercept and the slope may vary over
individual respondents. The model will handle observations at different time points for
different respondents, as is the case with our rolling panel.
While a random effects multilevel regression looks at variation both within and
between respondents, in a ﬁxed effects regression the emphasis is solely on variation
within respondents over the course of the campaign. Fixed effects regression constitutes a
more stringent test of media effects, since the impact of variables that do not vary over the
course of the campaign is controlled for. Hence, we look at the impact of only those
variables that vary within each respondent over the course of the campaign.53
Findings
Table 2 reports the ﬁndings from our analysis of party evaluation. The effects of media
opinion on feelings towards parties are reported for each party in two separate models the
ﬁrst presenting controls and general media effects, the second including interactions
between media effects and readership frequency as well as media effects and being an
undecided voter. The table presents unstandardised parameter estimates and standard
errors; statistically signiﬁcant effects are ﬂagged by asterisks.54
The parameter estimates for the constant in all three models show a distinct pattern: the
Conservatives start from a very low average thermometer score, while the Liberal Democrats
outperform Labour by a small margin. Although Labour almost catches up with the Liberal
Democrats over the course of the campaign, there is no relief for the Tories, who fall further
behind as the campaign proceeds, as the Wave 2 and 3 indicators make clear.
To summarize brieﬂy the effect of our included control variables, we can, as expected, see
how socio-economic and demographic factors affect thermometer scores differently for the
three parties. Age matters for Labour, but not for the Tories or the Liberal Democrats. For
Labour, the thermometer scores go down as respondents are older, indicating that Labour
scored better among younger respondents. Gender has no signiﬁcant effect on party
evaluation for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, other factors held equal. Women hold a
slightly more positive view of the Conservatives, but this effect is no longer signiﬁcant if
additional interactions are introduced to the model. Income does not signiﬁcantly affect
appreciation of the parties.55 For education, we see that having left school before the age of
16 is related to a higher appreciation of the Labour party and a lower appreciation of the
Liberal Democrats, while a continued education after the age of 18 leads to signiﬁcantly
lower scores for the Conservatives. However, and in line with recent ﬁndings about the
declining role of class in British politics, none of our class indicators prove signiﬁcant. Party
identiﬁcation exerts a strong inﬂuence in the model for all three parties. There are no surprises
here: party supporters – particularly those of the two main parties – evaluate their own party
signiﬁcantly more positively and other parties signiﬁcantly more negatively; party identiﬁers
do so to an even stronger degree than party ‘leaners’. Of note is the Tories’ predicament:
53 Both the random and ﬁxed effects estimates were obtained using STATA’s xtreg.
54 Table 2 presents the model for Liberal Democrats with media tone on Conservatives as the second
party. The model with media tone on the Labour party is presented in the Appendix.
55 We imputed the mean income for those respondents who failed to report their income. Since this
estimate is not signiﬁcant as well, these respondents show no signiﬁcant difference in evaluation of the
various parties.
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TABLE 2 Newspaper Tone and Party Evaluations (Random Effects Models)
Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats
I II I II I II
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Constant 3.34** 0.20 3.40** 0.22 2.20** 0.02 2.17** 0.22 Constant 3.87** 0.21 3.77** 0.21
Wave 2 indicator 0.85** 0.03 0.85** 0.03 0.49** 0.03 0.49** 0.03 Wave 2 indicator 0.55** 0.05 0.55** 0.05
Wave 3 indicator 0.90** 0.05 0.90** 0.05 0.48** 0.04 0.48** 0.04 Wave 3 indicator 0.55** 0.08 0.55** 0.08
Undecided voters 20.38** 0.08 20.43** 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.29 0.15 Undecided voters 0.38** 0.08 0.58** 0.11
Daily readers 20.23** 0.08 20.25 0.15 0.19* 0.07 0.05 0.15 Daily readers 20.39** 0.08 20.34** 0.11
Age (years since 18) 20.01** 0.00 20.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Age (years since 18) 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
Female 20.13 0.08 20.13 0.08 0.16* 0.08 0.15 0.08 Female 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08
Income (centred around mean) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Income (centred around mean) 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
Income-missing indicator 20.17 0.12 20.15 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.12 Income2missing indicator 20.23 0.13 20.24 0.13
Education: left school before age 16 0.29** 0.11 0.27* 0.11 20.10 0.11 20.09 0.11 Education: left school before age 16 20.31** 0.11 20.33** 0.11
Education: left school after age 18 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.09 20.30** 0.09 20.29** 0.09 Education: left school after age 18 0.04 0.09 20.03 0.09
Class: professional/managerial 20.19 0.11 20.20 0.11 20.05 0.11 20.04 0.11 Class: professional/managerial 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.11
Class: non-manual 20.13 0.11 20.11 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.10 Class: non2manual 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.11
Class: petty bourgeoisie 20.03 0.23 20.05 0.23 20.17 0.22 20.16 0.22 Class: petty bourgeoisie 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.23
Class: skilled manual 20.19 0.14 20.23 0.14 20.06 0.14 20.03 0.14 Class: skilled manual 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.15
Party identiﬁer: Labour 3.82** 0.11 3.76** 0.11 21.20** 0.11 21.16** 0.11 Party identiﬁer: Labour 0.99** 0.12 0.95** 0.12
Party identiﬁer: Conservatives 21.50** 0.13 21.43** 0.13 4.32** 0.12 4.29** 0.12 Party identiﬁer: Conservatives 20.32* 0.13 20.30** 0.13
Party identiﬁer: Liberal Democrats 0.50** 0.14 0.48** 0.14 20.47** 0.14 20.44** 0.14 Party identiﬁer: Liberal Democrats 3.45** 0.14 3.41** 0.14
Party leaner: Labour 2.92** 0.23 2.92** 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.23 Party leaner: Labour 1.03** 0.24 1.06** 0.24
Party leaner: Conservatives 20.87** 0.25 20.86** 0.25 2.76** 0.24 2.76** 0.24 Party leaner: Conservatives 20.14 0.26 20.17 0.26
Party leaner: Liberal Democrats 0.28 0.23 0.27 0.23 20.58* 0.23 20.57* 0.23 Party leaner: Liberal Democrats 2.25** 0.24 2.24** 0.23
Newspaper tone Newspaper tone
Labour (paper average) 0.77** 0.17 0.98** 0.31 21.92** 0.17 22.09** 0.31 Lib Dem (paper average) 3.38** 0.38 1.76* 0.69
Labour (centred on average) 0.30* 0.15 20.22 0.28 0.05 0.13 20.03 0.25 Lib Dem (centred on average) 20.24 0.26 20.37 0.48
Conservatives (paper average) 21.21** 0.28 21.26** 0.48 0.78** 0.27 0.94* 0.47 Conservatives (paper average) 21.01** 0.32 20.95 0.56
Conservatives (centred on average) 20.19 0.27 20.36 0.48 20.05 0.25 0.11 0.43 Conservatives (centred on average) 0.18 0.28 20.53 0.51
BBC Labour tone 0.02 0.25 0.08 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23 BBC Lib Dem tone 20.36 0.28 20.37 0.28
BBC Conservative tone 20.03 0.23 20.04 0.23 20.17 0.21 20.17 0.21 BBC Conservative tone 20.08 0.26 20.09 0.26
Interactions Interactions
Daily readers3Labour tone (avg) 0.78* 0.33 20.71* 0.33 Daily readers3Lib tone 3.14** 0.73
Daily readers3 variation Lab tone 0.07 0.30 20.04 0.27 Daily readers3 variation Lib tone 20.11 0.51
Daily readers3Con tone 21.37** 0.50 0.24 0.49 Daily readers3Con tone 21.35* 0.58
Daily readers3 variation Con tone 0.41 0.51 20.55 0.46 Daily readers3 variation Con tone 1.09* 0.54
Undecided3Lab tone 21.09** 0.33 0.99** 0.33 Undecided3Lib tone 20.11 0.73
Undecided3 variation Lab tone 0.95** 0.30 0.18 0.27 Undecided3 variation Lib tone 0.40 0.51
Undecided3Con tone 1.58** 0.49 20.60 0.49 Undecided3Con tone 1.32* 0.58
Undecided3 variation Con tone 20.13 0.51 0.30 0.46 Undecided3 variation Con tone 0.23 0.54
R2 overall 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.30
R2 within 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
R2 between 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.33 0.34
Note: **p, 0.01, *p, 0.05.
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Liberal Democrat supporters (both identiﬁers and ‘leaners’) evaluate the Tories negatively,
while they merely rate Labour less highly as their preferred party.
We include dummy indicators for regular readers and for undecided voters. The
ﬁndings vary substantially per party. For Labour, we ﬁnd that daily readers are
signiﬁcantly less positive about the party, and undecided voters even more so, all other
factors held equal. For the Conservatives, this pattern is exactly the reverse, although the
effect is only signiﬁcant for daily readers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Liberal Democrats
are more popular among undecided voters than among decided voters, although daily
readers hold the Liberal Democrats in lower regard than those who do not read their
paper every day. The estimates change as interactions are included in the model, as will be
discussed below, although the direction remains the same in most cases.
As discussed already, these individual characteristics can explain differences in party
evaluation between individual respondents. However, as these characteristics are stable
over the course of the campaign, they cannot explain variation in thermometer scores
within respondents during the campaign – something that the newspaper tone indicators
can explain.
Television and Newspaper Tone
In none of our models does (BBC) television news tone exert a signiﬁcant effect, but we
retain the variable as a control nevertheless.
The newspaper tone indicator variables convey each paper’s ‘regular’ tone on a party
(the paper average indicator, based on tone in the ﬁrst three days of the campaign), as well
as the variation around that tone over the course of the campaign (the ‘centred on
average’ indicator). For each respondent, data from his or her particular newspaper is
included, while per newspaper we include indicators on two of the three main parties to
avoid multicollinearity issues (see debate in the previous section).
The estimates reveal strong media effects in line with expectations. Notably, we ﬁnd that,
for all parties, house effects (impact of a paper’s average tone) are substantial and polarizing,
particularly with regard to the two main parties. A positive tone on Labour has a positive
effect on Labour thermometer scores but also a negative effect on Tory scores. The same holds
for the Conservatives. This also implies that criticism of Labour increases the popularity of the
Conservatives while criticism of the Tories improves ratings of Labour. In the model for the
Liberal Democrats presented here, we see a similar polarized pattern, with a strong positive
impact of treatment of the Liberal Democrats accompanied by a smaller but signiﬁcant
negative impact of treatment of the Conservatives. However, when Liberal Democrat
evaluations are set off against the media tone towards Labour (see Appendix), no signiﬁcant
impact of cross-party treatment remains. In that model, only praise or criticism of the Liberal
Democrats has the expected effect of increasing or depressing their thermometer scores. One
might argue that, in the 2005 election, the British newspapers polarized their readers in line
with a basic partisan cleavage that pitched the Conservatives against the other two parties.
It is also striking that, for the two main parties, negative house effects outweigh positive
effects. Most notably, attitudes towards the Conservatives were inﬂuenced more by
newspapers’ treatment of Labour than by their treatment of the Conservative Party itself.
Not only that, but the former effect was more than twice as large!
Next to the house effects, there are estimates for newspaper tone on each party as it
varies over the course of the campaign. These are our direct tests for media persuasion.
Here, we see that newspaper tone towards Labour positively and signiﬁcantly affects
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attitudes towards the party. Regardless of how positively or negatively a newspaper tends
to judge Labour on average, an even more positive or negative tone during the campaign
signiﬁcantly affects readers’ evaluation of the party. The effect is substantially smaller
than those of the house effects, and indeed for the other parties the estimates are not
distinguishable from zero. With our current data, we are left to speculate that this may be
caused by the dominance of the Labour party in this particular campaign.
Regular and Undecided Readers
We look at the impact of newspapers on regular readers and undecided voters in two
types of models: an extension of the random effects models (also presented in Table 2) and
through the use of ﬁxed effects regression models, presented in Table 3 below. We test for
additional media effects for these two groups by including interaction terms between the
dummy indicators and the media variables.
For daily readers, the house effects are clearly more pronounced, as the interactions with
the pre-campaign average show. The core readership is more in line with the newspaper’s
view on the respective parties, and for them in particular negative effects outweigh the
positives. Indeed, their attitudes towards the Conservatives are only signiﬁcantly and
negatively inﬂuenced by the tone towards Labour. However, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
interactions for variation in the tone of newspapers over the course of the campaign, apart
from a small positive effect of Conservative tone on Liberal Democrat appreciation among
daily readers (which can, of course, also be read as a negative effect on occasional readers),
where the overall impact of Conservative treatment is negative but insigniﬁcant.
For undecided voters, the story is reversed. Here, we see that the house effects are
smaller: the signiﬁcant interaction terms are in the opposite direction to the original
parameters, indicating a diminished effect for undecided voters. However, this is not the
case for the interaction with our second media indicator, assessing the variation of newspaper
tone over the course of the campaign. Here, we see that the tone of newspaper reporting
affects undecided voters more strongly than it affects voters who have already made up their
mind. Again, what matters is newspaper tone on Labour, which signiﬁcantly impacts on
attitudes towards the party. Hence, a two-fold pattern of media inﬂuence emerges: regular
readers, and those who have already made up their mind, are most affected by a newspaper’s
overall stance, while variation in tone over the course of the campaign actually affects those
who are still in the process of ﬁnalizing their party choice.
Although the inﬂuence of variation in newspaper tone over the course of the campaign
is the most convincing evidence of media persuasion, the house effects are of substantial
importance as well. They can affect voters by reinforcing attitudes and potentially
mobilizing supporters. In an increasingly ﬂuid political landscape, this may actually be a
media effect of increasing value to parties. As discussed above, although endogeneity
cannot be excluded with certainty, we mitigate its effects through the inclusion of party
identiﬁcation and party preference indicators. In the ﬁxed effects regression model,
presented in Table 3, we take this control one step further.
Robustness Test: Fixed Effects Model
In ﬁxed effects panel models the emphasis is on explaining variation within respondents,
not between them. The model achieves this by including a dummy variable for each
respondent (the estimates for which are not relevant and hence excluded from the table).
The focus on variation within respondents implies that only those variables that vary over
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TABLE 3 Fixed Effects Regression: Newspaper Tone and Party Evaluations
Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Constant 3.82** 0.05 3.41** 0.04 Constant 4.60** 0.10
Wave 2 indicator 0.86** 0.03 0.49** 0.03 Wave 2 indicator 0.53** 0.05
Wave 3 indicator 0.90** 0.05 0.49** 0.05 Wave 3 indicator 0.52** 0.08
Newspaper tone Newspaper tone
Newspapers Labour tone 20.37 0.35 0.01 0.31 Newspapers Lib Dem tone 20.84 0.59
Newspapers Conservative tone 20.38 0.59 20.06 0.52 Newspapers Conservative tone 20.15 0.63
BBC Labour tone 20.03 0.26 0.25 0.23 BBC Lib Dem tone 20.55 0.29
BBC Conservative tone 20.09 0.24 20.20 0.21 BBC Conservative tone 20.08 0.27
Interactions Interactions
Daily readers3Labour tone 0.30 0.45 20.16 0.40 Daily readers3LibDem tone 0.57 0.77
Daily readers3Conservatives tone 0.60 0.76 20.24 0.68 Daily readers3Conservatives tone 0.42 0.81
Undecided voters3Labour tone 1.44** 0.46 0.19 0.41 Undecided voters3Lib tone 1.05 0.78
Undecided voters3Conservatives tone 20.36 0.79 0.42 0.71 Undecided voters3Conservatives tone 20.19 0.82
Daily3Undecided3Labour tone 20.60 0.62 0.19 0.55 Daily3Undecided3LibDem tone 21.00 1.05
Daily3Undecided3Conservatives tone 20.19 1.07 20.50 0.96 Daily3Undecided3Conservatives tone 0.77 1.11
R2 overall 0.02 0.00 0.01
R2 within 0.17 0.07 0.08
R2 between 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: **p, 0.01, *p, 0.05.
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the course of the campaign are used to estimate the effects of interest. Differences between
respondents, including party identiﬁcation, are accounted for by the model so that
possible endogeneity is addressed by the model set up.
As most of our control variables are constant over the campaign (either by nature, or
because of the limitations of the survey), Table 3 presents estimates only for the Wave 2
and Wave 3 dummy indicators, the media variables, and their interactions with daily
reader and undecided voter dummy indicators. In a ﬁxed effects model, we no longer
include our media variables in two parts – it ignores the (constant) pre-campaign average.
To completely rule out any endogeneity effects, the newspaper tone indicator is centred
around the pre-campaign average. In effect, we are setting all initial newspaper tones to
zero – and look only at variation of tone over the course of the campaign. Combined with
the ﬁxed effects regression taking into account variance between respondents, we believe
this is the sternest test for media effects that non-experimental research will allow us. We
ﬁnd signiﬁcant results for Labour, and in line with expectations: undecided voters are
positively affected by the tone of their newspaper on Labour, regardless of the signature of
their newspaper. Note that this explains only variation within respondents, which means
that especially those who are still in the process of making a vote decision are responding
systematically to changing media stimuli during the campaign.
What we see here is that centring the media variables in the ﬁxed effects model removes
the house effects, which matter more for decided voters and regular readers. This
generates a quasi-experimental setting, which estimates responses to media stimuli that
are entirely independent of average partisan bias. And we ﬁnd that undecided voters are
systematically sensitive to those stimuli, but only where the main party, Labour, is concerned.
Scale and Impact of House and Campaign Effects
The ﬁndings from ﬁxed effects models show that attitudes of undecided voters towards
the Labour party are driven by trends in bias during the campaign. The latter short-term
campaign effects are the most unambiguous incidents of media persuasion. But what
difference does this make for our readers? We evaluate this in Figure 2, which shows the
predicted thermometer score for Labour, for decided and undecided voters, set off against
that reader’s newspaper tone on Labour (centred, ranging from 21 to 11), based on the
ﬁxed effects model, which centres the newspaper tone and hence controls for the overall
bias in any newspaper.
Since no further explanatory variables are included that can distinguish between voters,
the spread around the slope is very small and the model underestimates the average
thermometer score, but we are interested in the slope here. We see that decided voters are
virtually unaffected by variation in newspaper tone over the course of the campaign (the
slope is slightly negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant). For undecided voters we see a
clear upward trend: regardless of the initial tone of their newspaper, undecided voters are
more positive about Labour if their newspaper writes more positively about the party,
and more negative if it writes more negatively about the party over the course of the
campaign. This is controlling for any prior party preferences. As Figure 2 illustrates,
when newspaper tone changes from 20.2 to 10.4, thermometer scores increase by half a
point. That this is not a trivial increase becomes apparent when we look at Table 4.
Table 4 presents Labour’s average thermometer score among decided and undecided
voters who eventually chose Labour. Two features are striking. First, there is a substantial
difference in thermometer scores between decided and undecided voters, which, although
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not necessarily surprising, emphasizes that there is a substantial difference in Labour’s
popularity between these groups of voters. But second, and more importantly, we see very
different trends for both groups of voters. The Labour ratings from decided voters do
improve, but only between Waves 1 and 2 and only to a small degree. This helps to
explain why we ﬁnd no media impact on decided voters in the ﬁxed effects model (see
Figure 2, left panel). The ratings of undecided voters increase more substantially but, in
order eventually to choose Labour, still only an improvement of one and a half points is
required. This puts the effect shown in Figure 2 in perspective: an improvement of tone by
a quarter of the range (from 20.2 to 10.4) accounts for an increase in party evaluation of
about a third of what is required to sway an undecided voter. In other words, while the
absolute changes may appear small, their impact – net of other campaign efforts – can be
substantial for the group of voters most susceptible to persuasion.
CONCLUSIONS
Our ﬁndings strengthen the argument that it matters politically which paper you read, and
even more so what that paper writes. Clearly, newspapers attract a certain readership and
may well aim to publish opinions that can be expected to resonate with that readership.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd clear effects of the stances a paper takes towards each of the main
parties, and indeed an effect of differences in such stances between newspapers, even
between those that are generally understood to be on the same side in the political battle.
Even more pertinently, it emerges that a newspaper’s treatment of a party affects not only
how readers evaluate that party but also how they rate its competitors. For the big
parties, Labour and Conservatives, negative effects outweigh positive effects – in the sense
that each party beneﬁts more from criticism of its opponent than from direct support.
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Fig. 2. Predicted Labour thermometer scores against centred newspaper tone
TABLE 4 Average Thermometer Score for Labour per Wave, for Those Who
Eventually Voted Labour, for Decided and Undecided Voters
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Decided voters 7.8 8.3 8.3
Undecided voters 5.3 6.5 6.8
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From this one can deduce that relentless media criticism of a party during a campaign
does not seriously undermine that party’s popularity, but does more damage by
improving the ratings of its rivals. Much of the polarized coverage in partisan papers may
be dismissed as preaching to the converted, but our ﬁndings suggest that such divergent
treatment of parties has a reinforcing and potentially mobilizing effect by strengthening
pre-existing attitudes.
More importantly, however, our study shows quite conclusively that newspaper bias
matters for opinion formation or change. Irrespective of the kind of newspaper that a
respondent reads, the more positive the tone towards the incumbent party at the time of
the interview, the higher is that respondent’s like–dislike rating of Labour. Equally, the
more negative the reporting at the time directly preceding the interview, the deeper the
slump in the respondent’s opinion of Labour. And most notably, this effect only remains
for those still making up their minds during the campaign once we separate between
decided and undecided voters. Reinforcing media effects explain differences between
respondents and do so mostly for decided voters. But opinion formation is a matter of
within-respondent variation and change, and media inﬂuence only explains such within-
respondent variation for those who are still in the process of forming an opinion. Recall
that this is evidence for a direct link between party treatment in a newspaper and
subsequent reader attitudes towards parties, a link that is completely independent of the
overall political stance of that paper. Through centring newspaper tone around the stance
of a paper at the very beginning of the campaign, we are effectively running a blind test of
how sensitive readers are to variations in slant over the remainder of the campaign,
irrespective of whom the readers are or which newspaper they read. We ﬁnd undecided
voters to be sensitive enough to such variation that it makes a substantial contribution to
the kind of attitude change that could bring about their ultimate vote choice. This is clear
evidence of media persuasion, not merely framing or agenda setting.
These ﬁndings are highly encouraging, but they provide only a starting point. While
improving on studies that use proxies like media exposure or newspaper endorsements for
actual content, we still have to contend with some limitations ourselves. For example, we
needed to use a proxy for the missing content analysis data from the pre-campaign wave.
Also, the size of the panel study in 2005 does not allow us to model a newspaper’s
speciﬁc partisan stance or trajectory of endorsement over the course of the campaign
separately, to determine the impact a particular paper may have had on its readers.
Instead, we report ﬁndings that combine the effects of seven of the main national dailies.
This may actually result in underestimating the true impact of individual newspapers on
their readers. In the near future, we hope to be able to use input and output data that
cover the entire period for which such a three-wave rolling campaign panel is carried out,
also having access to a much larger panel study. This will increase the leverage of our
model, enable the testing of impact over a longer time-frame, and allow still closer
modelling of the dynamics of message and response mechanisms.
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APPEND IX
TABLE A1 Newspaper Tone and Party Evaluations, Liberal Democrats v. Labour (Random
Effects Models)
Liberal Democrats
Model I Model II
b s.e. b s.e.
Constant 4.12** 0.20 4.00** 0.21
Wave 2 indicator 0.55** 0.05 0.55** 0.05
Wave 3 indicator 0.53** 0.06 0.53** 0.06
Undecided voters 0.38** 0.08 0.36** 0.12
Daily readers 20.39** 0.08 20.09 0.12
Age (years since 18) 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
Female 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
Income (centred around mean) 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
Income-missing indicator 20.24 0.13 20.24 0.13
Education: left school before age 16 20.29** 0.11 20.30** 0.11
Education: left school after age 18 0.01 0.09 20.00 0.09
Class: professional/managerial 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.11
Class: non-manual 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.11
Class: petty bourgeoisie 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23
Class: skilled manual 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15
Party identiﬁer: Labour 1.01** 0.12 0.99** 0.12
Party identiﬁer: Conservatives 20.34** 0.13 20.34** 0.13
Party identiﬁer: Liberal Democrats 3.46** 0.14 3.42** 0.14
Party leaner: Labour 1.04** 0.24 1.07** 0.24
Party leaner: Conservatives 20.17 0.26 20.18 0.26
Party leaner: Liberal Democrats 2.26** 0.24 2.25** 0.24
Newspaper tone
Lib Dem (paper average) 2.10** 0.45 0.72 0.79
Lib Dem (centred on average) 20.14 0.22 20.62 0.40
Labour (paper average) 0.43 0.23 0.33 0.41
Labour (centred on average) 20.09 0.13 20.22 0.24
BBC Lib Dem tone 20.43 0.29 20.43 0.29
BBC Labour tone 20.00 0.29 20.01 0.29
Interactions
Daily readers3Lib tone 1.13 0.84
Daily readers3 variation Lib tone 0.45 0.43
Daily readers3Labour tone (avg) 0.74 0.43
Daily readers3 variation Lab tone 0.16 0.26
Undecided3Lib tone 1.53 0.83
Undecided3 variation Lib tone 0.50 0.43
Undecided3Lab tone 20.57 0.43
Undecided3 variation Lab tone 0.11 0.26
R2 overall 0.29 0.29
R2 within 0.07 0.07
R2 between 0.33 0.34
Note: ** p, 0.01, *p, 0.05.
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TABLE A2 Fixed Effects Regression: Newspaper Tone and Party
Evaluations, Liberal Democrats v. Labour
Liberal Democrats
b s.e.
Constant 4.61** 0.13
Wave 2 indicator 0.54** 0.05
Wave 3 indicator 0.50** 0.06
Newspaper tone
Newspapers Lib Dem tone 20.90 0.48
Newspapers Labour tone 20.08 0.30
BBC Lib Dem tone 20.57 0.30
BBC Labour tone 20.09 0.30
Interactions
Daily readers3LibDem tone 0.78 0.63
Daily readers3Labour tone 0.08 0.39
Undecided voters3Lib tone 0.95 0.64
Undecided voters3Labour tone 20.05 0.39
Daily*Undecided3LibDem tone 20.62 0.88
Daily*Undecided3Labour tone 0.11 0.53
R2 overall 0.01
R2 within 0.08
R2 between 0.00
Note: **p, 0.01, *p, 0.05.
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